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It is possible to distinguish roughly three grades of certainty in the
language of statutes of general operation: precisely measured terms,
abstractions of common certainty, and terms involving an appeal to
judgment br a question of degree. The great majority of statutes
operate with the middle grade of certainty. The language of the law
always aims at precision, while the, language of politics favors vague-
ness and ambiguity, for the former is chosen with a view to the ultimate
arbitrament of a court of justice, the latter with a view to immediate
effect upon sentiment or opinion. Some of the most general clauses
of American constitutions are phrased politically rather than legally,
but they are more legal in form than the Declaration of Independence;
and the more recent American constitutions are written almost like
statutes.
Abstractions of common certainty may be furnished by words of
popular usage, by technical terms, or by circumscribing definitions.
No general rule can be laid down as to which of these serves statutory
purposes best, although a good deal might be said about the illusory
certainty of some technical terms, and of cumulations and qualifica-
* This article is an attempt to work out, in a limited field, but in some detail,
principles of law applicable to the framing of legislation, i.e., principles that
should be observed in order to obtain a legally workable, not merely a constitu-
tional, statute.
The legitimate province of such a legislative jurisprudence remains to be
determined. The proper choice of terms is obviously one of its important prob-
lems; the choice of forms for legal acts another; the choice of methods of




tions sanctioned by traditional practice. Every common abstraction
has its "marginal" ambiguity, which mere elaboration of definition
cannot altogether remove.
The closest, approach to certainty is found in precise measurement,
where that form of expression is available. Matters of quantity and
quality can often be dealt with in this manner. The law may speak of
intoxicating liquors, or it may fix upon a percentage of alcohol. In
the history of liquor legislation the more generic term has not been
found altogether inadequate, while the superiority of the precise defini-
tion has to be paid for by the inconvenience of a more elaborate tech-
nical apparatus of administration and proof.
From the past and present practice of legislation we can learn a great
deal as to the relative advantages of precisely measured terms and
common abstractions, and the ways of handling either; but the consid-
erations applicable vary too much from case to case to be summarized in
comprehensive fashion.
It is otherwise with regard to the third class of terms, those repre-
senting the lowest grade of certainty, which may be characterized,
if we think of them favorably, as flexible, if we think of them unfavor-
ably, as indefinite. They involve either an appeal to judgment, or a
question, of degree. The former category is represented by such terms
as reasonable, proper, sufficient, suitable, necessary; where they are
used, flexibility is a deliberate object of legislative policy. The latter
category is represented by such terms as nuisance, coercion, undue
influence, immorality, depravity, reputability, sedition, unprofessional
conduct, unfairness, unsightliness, restraint of trade; their choice is
not so much matter of policy, as of inability to deal with a problem.
Some of these latter terms have the sanction of common-law recogni-
tion, while others represent new standards of which the common law
did not take cognizance. They fail to differentiate adequately either
the province of morals or of social restraint from the province of law,
or the province .of the unlawful from that of the legitimate and even
valuable. Both categories, considered from the point of view ofjustice, fail to give certain and equal operation, but on the other hand
are more adaptable to varying circumstances than fixed terms. From
the legislative point of view, facility of formulation counts in their
favor. From the point of view of official administration and individual
application, flexibility or indefiniteness has the double aspect of liberty
and peril. Liberty means not only a desirable latitude of action, but
also the temptation to take the benefit of the doubt; the peril lies in the
risk of error and misjudgment and its attendant consequences.
It follows that in deciding upon the admissibility of flexible or
indefinite terms, regard must be had to the circumstances under which,
the persons by whom, and the sense of responsibility with which, the
law will be applied, and to the c6nsequences which an error will entail.
Is there any risk of loss and on whom will it fall? Will it be the risk
of a penalty? of unsettling title, securities, status rights, or public
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revenues? a risk of damages? a liability to equitable or administrative
order or injunction? the risk that favorable official action will be denied?
the risk that a regulation or order will turn out to be invalid? or will
the risk be merely the disappointment of an expectation?
The use of indefinite terms should therefore be studied according as
they occur in penal legislation, in statutes creating civil liability, in laws
affecting titles, in acts operating through equitable relief, and in grants
of official power, and these categories will be taken up in succession.
I. PENAL LEGISLATION
(a) Trade nuisances. The law of nuisance is typical, because
whatever may be proclaimed by abstract definitions, it is impossible to
take a practical view of the law without making the degree of offen-
siveness a controlling factor. To make it, however, a matter of degree
whether a valuable industry is legitimate or liable to be penalized, is so
unsatisfactory a criterion in the administration of criminal justice, that
the practical result will be either a toleration of technical nuisances or a
substitution of more definite tests by regulative legislation. The
common type of legislation has been that of licensing offensive or
dangerous trades, or assigning places where they may be carried on,
as was done in Massachusetts in 1785 and in England by the Public
Health Act of 1848, revised in I875. The English Public Health Act
deals with many things and conditions described as carried on or main-
tained "so as to be a nuisance," but with regard to many of these no
penalty can be imposed under the Act except for contravention of
specific orders.2 The British Alkali Acts (1863 to i9O6), although
they do not dispense entirely with reference to 'nuisance' or pracfica-
bility,3 make an attempt to prescribe, as far as may be, specifically the
conditions with which highly offensive and yet essential industries must
comply.4
These acts expressly save any remedy by action, indictment, or
otherwise, for what would be deemed a nuisance if it were not for the
act.5 A standard English treatise on criminal law6 also states the law
of nuisance by reference to old decisions as if it were entirely unaffected
by modem regulative legislation. The unwillingness to surrender or
abate common-aw standards must be recognized as a characteristic
of legal policy. But formal savings count for little in comparison
with actual operation. The necessary practical effect of regulation
1 II and 12 Vict. (i848)'c. 63; Public Health Act, i875.
'Sees. gi-98.
'Alkali and Works Regulation Act, i9o6, sees. 2, 3, 4.
'Condensation of muriatic acid gas to the extent of 95%, each cubic foot of air
escaping not to contain more than 1/5 of grain of muriatic acid.
'Alkali Act, i9o6, sec. 29; Public Health Act, 1875, sec. ii.
'2 Russell, Crimes (7th ed. I909) 1833.
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must be to supersede prior indefinite standards. The more effective
must drive out the less effective rule, perfunctory declarations to the
contrary notwithstanding. The non-enforcement of the general crimi-
nal law with regard to nuisances covered by legislative or administra-
tive regulation confirms this view. In Oklahoma it is expressly
provided' that "nothing which is done or maintained under the express
authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance." This provision has
been applied to a license granted by an administrative officer."
(b) Flexible terms and combinations in restraint of trade. The
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 189o punishes by fine and imprisonment
every combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the states
or with foreign nations, and all monopolizing of; or attempts or combin-
ations to monopolize, such trade. "Monopolize," as the word is used
in the Act, is satisfied by a virtual control of some branch of trade or
industry; hence the term is one of degree, the percentage of the control
that constitutes the virtual monopoly never having been definitely
fixed." Restraint of* trade was at first interpreted as covering any
scheme reducing competition between independent concerns, whether
economically justifiable or not,10 thus making the concept at least
sufficiently definite if otherwise unworkable. This definiteness was
subsequently sacrificed in favor of the "rule of reason" that was read
into the law by the Standard Oil and Tobacco decisions,1 and the
illegality of restraint of trade, was made to depend upon the undeter-
minable concept of public injury which had made the old criminal law
of conspiracy odious and an instrument of abuse. It is interesting to
note by way of contrast that the corresponding Australian Act of i9o612
spoke of restraint of trade to the detriment of the public, and that these
latter words were struck out by an amending act of 191o. In a case
arising under the unamended Act the High Court of Australia protested
against being asked to say
"what is the highest price at which coal could be sold without causing
detriment to the public, with the result that if its ex post facto opinion
should differ from that of the sellers they are liable to heavy penalties"' i s
'Rev. Laws Okla. 1910, sec. 4253.
'Dupont Powder Co. v. Dodson (1915) 49 Okla. 58, I5o Pac. 1O85.
'The word "monopoly" has been used in the various senses of "complete con-
trol of a trade," "dominating influence in a trade," "practical control of a sub-
stantial part of a trade," "securing the greater part of a trade by keeping others
out, whether by ordinary means of competition or otherwise," and "retain-
ig possession of a trade actually enjoyed." Adelaide S. S. Co. v. Rex (1912,
Aus.) 15 C. L. R. 65, 8o.
" Traffic Agreement Cases, United States v. Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 29o,
17 Sup. ,Ct. 54o; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn. (i8g8) 71 U. S. 505, 19
Sup. Ct 25.
'Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 3 Sup. Ct 502; United
States v. Ameeican Tobacco Co. (1911) 221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup.- Ct. 632.
Australian Industries Preservation Act, i9o6.
'Adelaide S. S. Co. v. Rex, supra note 9, at p. 97. The court thus disposed on
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After the Supreme Court had given the Sherman Law an interpreta-
tion which made the criminality of acts dependent upon matter of
degree and of opinion, it was contended that the acts so construed could
not stand as a legitimate or valid exercise of legislative power. This
contention the Supreme Court denied ;14 but it has sufficient truth in it
to affect the actual administration of justice. The Department of
Justice continued to prosecute criminally, but declared it to be its
policy to proceed only in case of plain or intentional violations.
1 5 Even
so its efforts have been attended by very indifferent success. It has
failed in what were generally believed to be its strongest cases: the
Cash Register Case,16 in which criminal proceedings have been finally
abandoned,17 and the Nash or Naval Stores Case, in which after the
reversal of the first sentence a new trial resulted in a verdict of not
guilty18 None of the few sentences of imprisonment appear to have
been carried into effect, verifying President Taft's statement that in
the enforcement of a statute which makes unlawful, because of its
evil tendencies, that which has been in the past regarded as legitimate,
juries are not inclined by their verdicts to imprison individuals.: Look-
irig back over the history of the original enforcement of the law, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that Senator Sherman was right when
at one stage of the passage of his bill through Congress he declared
that in the present state of the law it was impossible to describe in
precise language the nature and limits of the offenses in terms specific
enough for an indictment, and that he was therefore clearly of the
opinion that it was not wise to include penal sections in the bill.
19 The
Clayton Act is a first step in specifying illegal practices condemned by
the policy of the Sherman Law, and indicates the lines along which
criminal legislation will have to proceed to satisfy the requirement of
definiteness.
(c) Flexible terms in labor legislation. The use in factory laws of
such terms as proper, suitable, adequate, necessary, sufficient, practi-
cable, or reasonable, has often been commented on. The commissioner
of labor of New York in his Report of 1go referred to the provision
in the labor law -for "proper and sufficient ventilation,"20 which he
considered practically inoperative without a definite rule-making power.
With this law should be compared the health, safety, and comfort law
appeal of a case in which the trial judge had written a opinion covering over 250
printed pages establishing the fact and the intent of detriment to the public.
Rex. v. Associated N5rthern Collieries (91I, Aus.) 14 C. L. R. 387-667. The
Privy Council confirmed the reversing judgment of the Australian High Court.
Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co. [1913, P. C.] A. C. 781.
'Nash v. United States (1913) 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct 78D.
15 (1916) Rep. Atty. Gen. 24.
:' United States v. Patterson (1915, C. C. A. 6th) 222 Fed. 599.
1* (1916) Rep. Atty. Gen. 25. ' (I914) Rep. Atty. Gen. 17.
"
t Enforcement Provisions of the Sherman Law (1912) 20 JoUR. PoL. EcoN.
462.
. Consol. Laws N. Y. I9o9, ch. 3r, sec. 86.
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of Illinois, requiring 500 cubic feet of air space for each person
employed, with other specified particulars. 1  "All vats, pans, ... and
machinery of every description, shall be properly guarded. '22  Letters
of inquiry sent out by state officials elicited the common response that
machinery was guarded as well as possible. "All doors . . .shall be
so constructed as to open outwardly where practicable.1 23  Of 1243
factories only 22 per cent found it practicable to have their doors open
outward. The Illinois law2' leaves out the words "when practicable,"
and the like change was made in New York -in 1913. An account of
the labor law administration in New York says:
"The factory code contains extensive regulations concerning equipment
and ventilation, safety of gangways, lighting, heat, accommodations
for workers, condition of repair of tools and apparatus, and employment
of women . . ., but has proven extremely difficult to enforce because
such indefinite terms as 'suitable,' 'sufficient,' and 'properly' are used
repeatedly instead of definite standards."25
This account has nothing to say on the enforcement of the law requiring
seats for female employees and permission to use them, a silence easily
understood in view of the provision requiring permission "to such an
extent as may be necessary for the preservation of their health."2 6
It does not matter that in all these cases the flexible term is used
objectively, that it is not the judgment of the employer which is meant
to be conclusive, but in the last resort the judgment of the court or
jury; for the first appeal is necessarily to the employer's discretion.
and a court or jury is not apt te convict him criminally for what he
may plead was an error of judgment.27
The objection to such terms as "proper," "sufficient," "suitable"
in penal statutes applies only where these words enter as material
ingredients into the description of the offense. Where without them
the requirement is fully intelligible, their addition is harmless, and may
simply emphasize the inadmissibility of a purely literal or evasive
compliance. Thus it does not weaken' a statute requiring an elevator
shaft to be enclosed, to say properly or sufficiently or securely enclosed. 28
For the reason indicated the term "substantial" is nearly always unob-
jectionable.
A reference to practicability is a much more serious qualification,
particularly since it has to be affirmatively established against the
person charged." Moreover, the objection to indefinite provisions
"Rev. St. Ill. 1911, ch. 48, sec. 99. "N. Y. Labor Law, igog, sec. 8i.
'Id., sec. 8o. "Rev. St. Ill. 1911, sec. IO3.(1917). 7 Am. LABOR LEaIsLATIo REv. 331.
N. Y. L. 897, ch. 415, sec. 27o, Consol. Laws N. Y. I909, sec. 7o.
'The experience in France has been the same; see Pic, Traite limentaire de
legislation industrieile (2d ed. I9O2) sec. 637; Andre-Guibourg, Treatise on Labor
Legislation, p. I8i.
' Health, safety, and comfort law, Rev. St. Ill. 1gr1, ch. 48, sees. 89, A, etc.
" State v. Rodgers (2go) 275 Ind. 25, 93 N. E. 2a,
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applies with full force mainly where the provision addresses itself
directly to, the individual, to be complied with under penalty. A
different situation arises where there is an opportunity for administra-
tive specification, and the operation of the law is such that the generic
statutory injunction is thus particularized. Where this is the case,
not only is the injustice or impracticability of the indefinite provision
removed, but in a positive requirement, as distinguished from a restraint
or limitation, the generic may be preferable to the specific form, because
it interferes less with individual liberty and leaves room for private
initiative in the choice of methods to produce the required result. A
mere reference to this distinction must here suffice.
(d) Indefinite terms in speed laws. The former law of Illinois 0
forbade under penalties the operation of an automobile "at a speed
greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and
use of the way, or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the
property of any person."
A similar provision was declared unconstitutional in Georgia as too
uncertain and indefinite for enforcement, the words reasonable and
proper constituting a dragnet rather than a definite standard.3' In
Ohio a similar provision was sustained, the court saying:
"The legislature wrote into the statute what has become known as
the 'rule of reason' ever since the Standard Oil Case. . .and Tobacco
Trust Case . . .were decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States. In those cases the Supreme Court of the United States read
into the statute the so-called 'rule of reason' holding that the Anti-
Trust Act really was not a denial of all restraint of trade, but only a
denial of unreasonable restraint of trade. It would hardly be suggested
that the Supreme Court of the United States read into the statute
something that made the statute unconstitutional, or read into the
statute something that made it so indefinite and uncertain that it was
incapable of advising the public as to what was or was not an offense
under it, or that made the statute practically unenforceable." 32
As has been demonstrated before, that is exactly what the Supreme
Court did.
A somewhat less indefinite, though still flexibie criterion is found in
the British Motor Car Act, I9O3, which penalizes diving
"recklessly or negligently, or at a rate of speed or in a manner which
is dangerous to the public, having regard to-all the circumstances of
the case, and the nature, condition and use of the highway, and to the
amount of traffic which actually is at the time, or which might reason"
ably be expected to be, on the highway"-
an elaborateness of statement obviously more for the protection of the
driver than of the public, but for that very reason more appropriate to
a penal statute than the opposite policy.
"Rev. St. IIL. 19II, ch. i2r, sec. 269j.
'Hayes v. State (Igr2) ii Ga. App. 371, 75 S. E. 523.
"State v. Schaeffer (I917) 96 Oh. St 215, 230, 117 N. E. =o, 224.
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Yet a due regard for the protection of the public demanded that the
driver should be subject to less elastic restraints, and .thus brought up
the question of a fixed speed limit. This gave occasion to a spirited
debate in the House of Commons, the most conspicuous instance of a
parliamentary discussion of the issue: fixed versus flexible.
The automobile interests resisted a fixed limitation, and had at the
beginning the support of the government, one of the principal argu-
ments relied upon being that a maximum speed limit tended to become
the normal rate, and was against the interest of safety, which required
adjustment to varying conditions. On the other side it was pointed
out that exclusive ?eliance upon the flexible terms recklessness, negli-i
gence, danger, etc., practically made the policeman the sole interpreter
of the Act. The demand for the fixed limit proved so strong that the
government finally yielded. The President of the Local Government
Board, who had first insisted that a maximum speed tended to become
the normal speed, now defended a high fixed maximum by the argu-
ment that whatever the maximum, the aver'age speed would be little
more than half. The final result was a speed limit of twenty miles,
and the retention of the prohibition of reckless driving, the latter being
more heavily penalized than the excess of the fixed limit33
The laws of New York and Illinois combine the two methods of
regulation by making the transgression of a fixed speed limit presump-
tive or prima facie evidence of the violation of the generic restraints
of the respective acts. This solution of the problem was not suggested
in England. In effect this means that any one who exceeds the fixed
limits is prima facie guilty, but may exculpate himself by proving that
under the circumstances the transgression was not recklessA4
The illustrations given are sufficient to establish the proposition that
indefinite terms have failed or proved unsatisfactory in penal statutes.
It matters little under these circumstances whether courts sustain them
as constitutional or not." From the point of view of broad constitu-
tional principle, it may well be contended that the same principle which
requires specification in indictments, requires specification in the
statute v hich is the foundation of the indictment; and it should also
be pointed out that the strong demand for the codification of the
criminal law both in America and on the continent of Europe was
largely inspired by the general abhorrence of undefiAed offenses, which
found expression in Article 4 of the French Declaration of Rights
of 1789.
But as a matter of legislative policy, the possible injustice to the
individual counts perhaps for less than the proved futility of statutes
which courts and juries are unwilling to enforce.38
126 Hans. 1487, 15o7; 127 id. 413.
See People v. Beak (i2o) 291 Ill. 449, 126 N. E. 2oi.
'Nash v. United States, supra note 14.
20I have purposely omitted the consideration of recent legislation against
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II. LEGISLATION CREATING CIVIL LIABILITY
(a) Safety legislation. If the controlling consideration against the
use of flexible terms in penal legisiation is the resulting unenforceability
of the law, flexible terms are not objectionable in the same way where
the risk of an error of judgment as to the meaning of the statute
consists in the incurring of a civil liability. A jury that will refuse
to convict for a mistake may have no hesitation in giving a verdict
for damages, particularly if the plaintiff is poor and the defendant is
rich. The terms "safe," "sufficient," etc., which have proved unsuc-
cessful in labor legislation for criminal purposes, have therefore
presented no difficulty in litigation to enforce the employer's civil
liability. On the contrary, labor interests will prefer generic terms
as presenting better chances of recovering demages. The mining law
of Illinois of 1911 required dusty haulage roads to be thoroughly
sprinkled at regular intervals designated by the mine inspector, thus
creating a specific duty.37 The fear was at once expressed that the
question of the sufficient frequency of the sprinkling might be no
longer left to the jury, and the liability of the operator thereby
reduced, 38 and at the next session of the legislature the law was amended
by eliminating the reference to designation by the mine inspector.
The objection that indefiniteness of standards gives an advantage to
the plaintiff at th4 possible sacrifice of justice to the defendant has never
weighed strongly as against the claims of safety.
Particularly in the relation between railroad companies and the
public an undefined degree of duty of care (a common-law, not a
statutory duty) has been construed as a duty of the highest possible
care with practically every presumption against the railroad company,
resulting in an enormous increase in the safety of passenger transpor-
tation. If the conditions of the railroad business have perhaps in this
respect been exceptional, it is because it is the one dangerous business
with which the public is in constant contact; dangerous industries
affect employes in the main, with regard to whom the duty of safety
is qualified by the doctrine of assumption of risk. Recent workmen's
compensation legislation has, however, placed the employe, in respect
of the principle of liability, upon an even better footing than the rail-
road passenger.
This new legislation gives indeed the clue to the principle which
makes a person civilly liable for an error of judgment upon a question of
safety: it is that the privilege to carry on an enterprise may be
criminal anarchy and sedition. It operates with indefinite terms, and many
convictions have been secured notwithstanding. The psychology of political
legislation is abnormal, and it ought to %be considered by itself. See my article
on Freedom of Speech and Press in the Nnw REPUBLIC of Feb. I6th, 1921.
" Rev. St. Ill. 1911, ch. 93, sec. 2o, par. I5.
', See Thomas, Changes in the Illinois Mining Law (1912) 6 Iii. L. REv. 395,
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burdened with an absolute duty of insuring safety. An absolute duty
is a definite duty and makes the flexibility of standards irrelevant.
If, however, after the establishment of such an absolute liability, the
violation of duties is to be visited with penalties or additional liabilities,
these duties should be specific duties. This was recognized by the
supreme court of Ohio in the case of American Woodenware Mfg. Co.,
v. Schorling.83
The constitution of Ohio provides for workmen's compensation
legislation taking away rights of action or defenses from employes
and employers;40
"but no right of action shall be taken away from any employe when the
injury, disease or death arises from failure of the employer to comply
with any lawful requirement for the protection of the lives, health and
safety of employes."
The question arose whether the term "lawful requirement" compre-
hends every duty imposed by common-law principles. The workmen's
compensation act in force when the constitutional amendment was
adopted, left unimpaired the employer's regular civil liability in case
of an injury arising from failure to comply with a municipal ordinance
or lawful order of any duly authorized officer or any statute for the
protection of the life or safety of the employes. The court construed
the term "lawful requirements" as referring to these specific enumera-
tions.
"If the failure to comply 'with a lawful requirement' includes an act
which was actionable negligence simply because of the rules of common
law, then the portion of the section which authorizes the taking away
of any or all rights of action or defenses of employes and employers
would be practically meaningless and inoperative."
And a mere general duty imposed by statute stands on the same
footing as a duty arising from the common law. For the industrial
commission act of Ohio in terms requires every employer to furnish
employment which shall be safe for the employes therein, defining
safety as such freedom from danger as the nature of the employment
will reasonably permit.
It seems clear that -the decision of the Ohio court stands for the idea
that after the rule of absolute civil liability has been satisfied, any
further liability (which in that event is quasi-penal, being special and
unlimited) should be predicated upon -the violation of specific duties,
and not upon the non-compliance with standards so general as to become
matter of degree or of judgment.
(b) Civil liability for injury suffered from monopolistic enterprises
under the Sherman- Anti-Trust Act. The majority of actions brought
(the total number has been small) has been for practices directed
"(1917) 96 OIL St. 305, 313, 117 N. F 366, 369.
"Const. Ohio (185x) Art. 2, sec. 35.
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specifically against the complainant: refusal to sell; attempt to drive
out of business; attempt to coerce into joining a combination; attempt
to acquire control of voting power. These also constituted conspiracies
against the plaintiff; and while the British House of Lords has denied
that they are actionable, the actionability has been distinctly affirmed
by the Sherman Act.
Only three of the cases have complained of injury suffered incident-
ally from the economic effects of monopolies, alleged to have been illegal,
under the law, by reason of detriment to the public: in two of these"
the pleadings were held sufficient, in one42 damages were actually
recovered. The difficulty of establishing a proximate causal connection
between monopoly on the one side and on the other side particular loss
of trade, or the enhancement of prices, or the deterioration of services,
or the loss of employment, is such as to account for the paucity of
cases and the improbability of their success. Could this difficulty be
removed, the difference in point of justice would appear between a
civil liability imposed by reason of engaging in an enterprise specifically
forbidden by statute (e. g. consolidation of competing railroad lines)
and one imposed by reason of a consolidation of concerns the legality
or illegality of which is made to depend upon the speculative factor of
detriment to the public. It is possible to say: you engage in industry
at your peril so far as injury to employees, or injury to adjoining
land owners is concerned; but it is an economic absurdity to say: you
may expand your business upon condition of indemnifying against all
incidental economic losses. The fairness of absolute liability is the
test of justice in maldng indefinite standards the basis of civil liability.
(c) Trustee's civil liability. The English Settled Land Act, 1882,
gives a power'of sale to every tenant for life, who for the purposes of
the Act is a trustee.43 The Act provides that every sale shall be made
at the best price that can reasonably be obtained."4 In favor of a
purchaser in good faith a conclusive presumption is created that the
price paid is the best price, but not in favor of the life tenant, as far as
his liability to the remainderman is concerned. The Trustee Act,
1893, provides that no sale made by a trustee shall be impeached by any
beneficiary upon the ground that any of the conditions subject to which
the sale was made may have been unnecessarily depreciatory, unless it
also appears that the consideration for the sate was thereby rendered
inadequate.' Thus the statutes seem to recognize a civil liability for
inadequacy of price obtained,--surely a matter of error of judgment.
This is the more surprising, as in even the hardest cases in which
courts of equity had held trustees liable to beneficiaries, there had nearly
always been a technical violation of duty or at least what the court
' Monarch Tobacco Works v. American Tobacco Co. (i9o8, W. D. Ky.) i65
Fed. 774; Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co. (igio, E. D. N.
C.) x8o Fed. x6o.
Chattanobga Foundry v. City of Atlanta (Igo6) 203 U. S. 390, 27 Sup. Ct. 65.
Sec. 3. "Sec. 4. 'Sec. 14.
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regarded as a plain neglect of a testamentary direction.4 A liability
beyond this-based on honest mistake-has been enforced by courts
of equity only in rare instancesY.4
The clear tendency of English legislation has been to relax the
strictest rules of the trustee's liability and to make some duties specific
while relieving him from others. Jessel, M. R., said of section 37 of
the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, I88I, (giving trustees
power to pay, compromise, etc., without responsibility for loss occa-
sioned by anything done in good faith) that it would have a revolu-
tionary effect on this branch of the law. This, however, was superseded
by the Trustee Act, 1893. In 1896 a sweeping provision was enacted
permitting a court to relieve a trustee where he has acted honestly
and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust.8
If the provisions first cited involve untenable principles of liability,
there is at least a statutory power of giving full relief.
III. INDEFINITE REQUIREMENTS AND THE SECURITY OF TITLES
Reference has been made to the provision of the English Settled
Land Act, 1882, section 4, requiring that a sale made by a life tenant
under the power given by the Act must be made at the best price that
can reasonably.be obtained. Sales would become impossible in the
absence of further provision, if their validity were made dependent
upon compliance with this requirement; hence the further provision
in section 54 that in favor of a purchaser in good faith the price paid
is to be taken conclusively to be the best price obtainable. This example
will illustrate the impracticability of making titles dependent upon
requirements the meaning of which varies with differences of judgment
or discretion.
A further example: it is sometimes said that a condition against
alienation is valid, provided it is reasonable. Can a rule of validity
be thus circumscribed? Suppose the condition is against alienation
to persons of Japanese nationality. If only Japanese will buy in that
neighborhood, the condition becomes unreasonable, with the effect that
a Japanese can buy; but he takes the risk that a court may hold the
condition reasonable, and therefore buys the risk of a lawsuit. There-
fore he will not buy. The condition is therefore practically effective
though unreasonable, the uncertainty of the test of validity being fatal
to the rule against unreasonable conditions; to strike at unreasonable
conditions, it is necessary to make all conditions against alienation
absolutely void. The rule of reasonableness has been strongly criticized
in England.49
"Sculthorpe v. Tipper (1871) L. R. 13 Eq. 232.
"Dickinson, Appellant (1890) I5z Mass. 184, 25 N. E. 99.
'Judicial Trustee Act, 896, sec. 3.
"Re Roslier (1884) L. R. 26 Ch. 8ol; see Gray, Restraints against Alienation
(2d ed. 1895) secs. 31-44.
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It was held in England that where a power was given to distribute
property among children in such shares as the holder of the power
should direct, each child should be entitled to la substantial share; an
appointment to what was called an illusory share was invalid. The
doctrine was found so inconvenient that the legislature interfered
by providing that in future no appointment might be objected to on the
ground of its being illusory ;50 and in America the doctrine has been
likewise abolished by statute51 or repudiated by the courts.
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The doctrine of implied revocation of wills was finally worked out
in England as meaning that revocation would- result from subsequent
marriage and birth of issue if the testator failed to make substantial
or adequate provision for the wife and issue,53 thus making revocation
a matter of the greatest uncettainty. Again the legislature interfered
and made the simple provision that every will should be revoked by the
subsequent marriage of the testator5 4-- a provision adopted in a number
of American states.
There are at least two instances in the early English law of property
in which indefinite provisions have yielded to definite ones. Magna
Charta provided that no man should give or sell any more of his land
but that of the residue the lord might have the service due him; in 129 o
this was superseded by the absolute prohibition of subinfeudation.r5
And the "reasonable part" of the widow in time became one-third.
Where the correct exercise of judgment enters into the exercise of
rights or powers affecting title as a condition of validity, it is necessary
to afford statutory facilities for immediately determining the matter
of judgment. The statute of Illinois permits adoption where it is for
the best interest of the child.56 This is a practicable condition because
adoption is effected through a judicial proceeding which at once settles
the question of best interest; it would be impracticable if adoption were
effected by deed, as it was until recently in Missouri.5 7
In similar manner, the flexible term may be harmless where an
authoritative determination must in the nature of things be speedily
forthcoming. British legislation has for some time enlarged the rights
of the agricultural tenant against the landlord. The Irish Land Act,
i88i, carefully enumerated the conditions for the breach of which
the tenant might be compelled to quit.5 For England the Agricultural
Holding Act, i9o8, gives the tenant a right to compensation if the
landlord "without good and sufficient cause and for reasons inconsis-
goi Geo. IV & i Win. IV (1830) c. 46; see Gainford v. Dunn (1873) L. R. 17
Eq. 4o5; also 37 & 38 Vict. (1874) c. 37.
"Consol. Laws N. Y. sgo9, ch. 5o, sec. 138.
"Hawthorn v. Ulrich (9o4) 2o7 Ill. 43o, 69 N. E. 885; Ingraha7n v. Meade
(1846, U. S. D. C. D. Ga.) 3 Wall. Jr. 32.
"Is-raell v. Rodon (839) 2 Moore P. C. 57.
54Wills Act, 7 Win. IV & I Vict. (1837) c. 26.
"Statute Quia Emptores (ifgo). ' Rev. St. Ill. I919, ch. 4, sec. 3.
"See Rev. St. Mo. 1909, sec. 167i; L. Mo. 1917, p. 193.
"Sec. 5.
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tent with good estate management" terminates a tenancy by notice to
quit or refuses to grant a renewal ;9 and the Scotch Small Landholders
Act, 1911, gives a right to renewal unless there is reasonable ground
or objection to the tenant.6 0 These provisions undoubtedly make the
right of the landlord entirely a matter of judgment, but the English
Act gives a speedy remedy by arbitration, and under the Scotch Act
the question must necessarily be brought to an issue at the termination
of the old tenancy. There is no possibility of rights being kept in an
uncertain condition for a considerable period of time.
And it may be generally observed for American legislation that
wherever the law affects the devolution of titles by testamentary
disposition, the objection to indefinite terms is largely overcome by the
fact that the normal course of administration results in a judicial settle-
ment of accounts. This has not in the past been true of either English
or continental legislation. Even under such a state of the law, how-
ever, indefinite terms inevitably invite and produce litigation and the
waste and expense connected with it.
IV. OBLIGATIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OPERATING THROUGH EQUITABLE
RELIEF
There is very little hardship in civil obligations of flexible content
which are enforced through equitable relief and not through liability
in damages. The British Money Lenders' Act, i9oo, is typical. It
authorizes a court to reopen a transaction and take an account where
it is satisfied that charges are excessive, or that the transaction is
harsh and unconscionable or otherwise such that a court of equity
would give relief. The German Civil Code, which renders usurious
transactions null, defines them more carefully as transactions in which
one party, exploiting the distress, improvidence, or inexperiencet of
another, stipulates pecuniary benefits so much exceeding the considera-
tion that according to the circumstances there is a striking dispropor-
tion between the two.6 '
Another illustration is furnished by a provision of the German Civil
Code concerning easements.62 If an easement concurs with another
easement in the same land so that both rights cannot be enjoyed or
fully enjoyed together, and if they are of equal rank, each party may
demand an adjustment of the exercise of the rights which reasonably
satisfies the interests of all. The whole matter being left to equitable
adjustment, flexible terms are properly used.
V. FLEXIBLE TERMS AND GRANTS OF OFFICIAL POWER
The distinguishing feature in this class of cases is that the language
of the statute is addressed in the first instance to public officials, and
not to private individuals.
Sec. II. " Sec. 32.
'German Civil Code (x9oo) Art. 13& "Art. io24.
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The use of indefinite or flexible terms in the grant of official powers
means the grant of discretionary powers. Official discretion may tend
to become arbitrary or unwise discretion, and may on that ground be
politically objectionable; but a statute does not for that reason alone
become unworkable, and there is on the contrary a general impression
that from the point of view of technical operation, there can be no harm
in using general terms to indicate the scope of statutory power or
jurisdiction.
Applying again the test of the risk of error and of who bears it, it
appears that in the exercise of either administrative or of subordinate
legislative power an erroneous interpretation simply makes the exercise
of the power invalid, without of its own force exposing the individual
to penalty or liability and without disturbing or unsettling titles. The
exercise of the power advises the individual specifically of what his
course of action is expected to be, and it is not unfair to throw upon
him the risk that attends non-compliance on his part 'if he proposes to
rely upon the invalidity of the official act. He has the chance of its
being declared invalid; on the other hand, there is the chance that a
liberal construction of power may be-ultimately sustained by the court,
with a consequent gain to public authority and to the public policy
which it represents. The question resolves itself into this: is the
chance of validity worth more than the risk of invalidity? And ordi-
narily it is. This is the general aspect of official powers expressed
in flexible terms; but a closer examination shows that in some types
of cases different issues arise, and that in exceptional cases flexible
terms are unworkable even in the grant of official powers. Practical
examples will illustrate the rule and its exceptions.
The rule. The rule can best be illustrated by contrasting grants of
official power with cases in which flexible 'terms have proved unwork-
able. The penal provisions of labor statutes operate unsatisfactorily
where duties are prescribed merely by reference to danger or injury;
but there can be no objection to authorizing labor officials to order the
safe-guarding of dangerous machinery or to withhold child labor
certificates in case of occupations injurious to health or morals. Such
discretion may be objectionable for other reasons, but it would not
constitute a technical defect. It would never do to authorize the heir
to convey the decedent's property free from any claim under an undis-
covered will, after a period of time depending upon circumstances,
but it is possible to authorize a court to declare that there are no heirs
and that consequently there is an escheat, after a period thus indicated. 63
While it is impracticable to make the validity of adoption by deed
dependent upon the interests of the child, that is a common provision
where adoption can only be effected by order or consent of court. A
board may be given power to vary a rate on an application of workmen
or employers which appears to the board to represent any considerable
"German Civil Code (igoo) Art. 1964.
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body of opinion amongst either workmen or employers;6 a board
or commission may be authorized to select for minimum wage inquiries,
occupations in which substantial numbers of women are engaged ;65 a
board may be authorized to take certain precautionary measures if a
district is threatened with a formidable epidemic or infectious disease.
In these cases a risk of error in either direction will leave the matter
where the legislature, in its discretion, might have placed it without
prejudicing plain equities. A qualification by way of abundant caution
may always be couched in flexible terms.
It is instructive to compare the terms restraint of trade and monopoly
in anti-trust acts with the term unfair competition in the Trade Com-
mission Act. The latter Act proceeds entirely through administrative
orders, and the individual is not called upon tt the peril of penalty or
civil liability to determine in the first instance whether a practice is or
is not unfair under the Act. While the Act declares unfair methods
of competition unlawful, it makes no provision for direct judicial
redress either civil or criminal. The Trade Commission was designed,
as expressed by its chairman, not as a punitive, but as a corrective
force.6   Any success that the Sherman Act has had has been almost
exclusively through the proceedings in equity which are somewhat in
the nature of prospective administrative proceedings and have been
so administered by the court. The minimum wage acts likewise have
been able to operate with the most general phrases because they do not
operate without those phrases being first defined administratively. It
is true that some of these acts in terms appear to make the violation
of the general clauses an offense,67 but this is an inadvertence without
practical effect; and if it is true that the individual is exposed to the
risk of administrative error, that risk is inevitable and not as great as
the risk of a legislative error, if the rate were directly fixed by statute
at a specific amount.
The exceptions. i. It is the chance of beneficial latitude of interpre-
tation that recommends the. grant of power in general or flexible terms;
if for any reason that chance fails, there is no advantage in the flexible
term. It is necessary to reckon with an official unwillingness to assume
the responsibility of discretion; if there-is that tendency, it may turn
out that the gain from flexibility is illusory. To illustrate:
It is not uncommon to lay down reputability as a statutory qualifica-
tion for being recognized in connection with semi-official acts (licenses,
petitions, endorsements, etc). "Reputable" is intrinsically a term of
degree, if not one of judgment; it seems to involve a wide latitude.
But no official would undertake to hold a person not reputable on the
basis of rumor or even of ordinary private statements. Nothing will
"British Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act, 1912, sec. 3 (2).
'Acts Mass. 1912, ch. 7o6, sec. 3.
' (x916) 102 CoM. & FIN. Cl NoN. 128.
'2 Ore. Laws 192o, sec. 6684; cf. Gen. Laws Calif. 1915, act i6o8, sec. ii.
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practically count against reputability except a judicial conviction, and
by converse reasoning, a previous conviction may be treated as estab-
lishing lack of reputability. It would be much better to name previous
conviction as a disqualification or as a basis for the exercise of unfavor-
able discretion, and thus fairly to face the question whether one
conviction should be allowed to have such far reaching effect. Here
the flexible term brings no advantage68
This is perhaps the most conspicuous case of the kind; but it will
be remembered that upon a very similar principle, the phrase "during
good behavior" has acquired the settled meaning of "for life, unless
misconduct be judicially proved."
2. There is no benefit in flexibility of expression if there is every
chance of its operating in the direction, of illiberality. Generic or
flexible terms of distinctly restrictive connotation are therefore 
less
desirable than fixed or specific terms. Advocates of municipal home rule
desire charter powers in general terms; to a specific enumeration of
the subjects on which the c ouncil may enact ordinances they prefer a
power of "local" or "municipal" legislation. But they would repudiate
the expression "strictly local" or "strictly municipal," which would in
advance resolve every doubt against the local power. Such forms are
appropriate only where the legislature makes a concession with the
consciousness of its undesirability.
The cities act of Illinois requires the levy of the amounts of appro-
priations by a tax levy ordinance "specifying in detail the purposes
for which such appropriations are made and the sum or amount appro-
priated for each purpose respectively."
'65  Tax levies have repeatedly
been held invalid for lack of sufficient specification,
7 0 and it would
certainly be in every respect advantageous if the statute itself specified
more in detail its own requirements. Suppose a similarly worded
requirement for the validity of a municipal bond issue; no bond issue
would be possible without a previous judicial determination of com-
pliance with the requirement.
3. Reference has been made to the advantage from the point of view
of home rule of having broad grants of a municipal powers. This
principle was however misapplied in California. The constitution of
that state provided from 1896 to 1913:
"Cities and towns heretofore or hereafter organized, and all charters
thereof framed or adopted by authority of this constitution (except
in municipal affairs) shall be subject to and controlled by general
laws." 7"
" The Victoria (Aus.) minimum -wage act, i9o3, defined a minimum wage
by reference to wages paid by reputable employers; in i9o7 this was abandoned,
it having been found too difficult to determine reputability.
'Rev. St. Ill. igig, ch. 24, sec. Iii.
"People v. Ry. (I9I) 252 Ill. 372, 96 N. E. 864.
" Const. Calif. i896, Art. ii, sec. 6.
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The exception to the rule.of subordination for municipal affairs gaveiise to a great deal of difficulty. I 1913 an amendment was adoptedgiving cities powers to make regulations in respect to municipal affairs
subject only to the restrictions of their charters, and in respect to other
matters subject to general laws. It has been said72 that the amendedphraseology changes the implication from a negative to a positive
character, but whatever the meaning of that may be, it leaves the real
difficulty untouched.
Why is it that a general grant of power of municipal regulation isbeneficial, and that a grant of power subject, except in municipal
affairs, to general laws, has been mischievous ? The reason is thatindefiniteness which may be desirable in the grant of a subordinate posi-
tive power, is extremely undesirable in defining the relations between
two competing powers. The risk of erroneous interpretation in the
former case is the invalidity of an ordinance; the individual may
escape any risk by submitting to the doubtfil ordinance. But in thelatter case the risk of erroneous interpretation results in a dilemma;
no one knows whether the state law or the local law prevails; it is not
a matter of valid or void, but of conflict and duplicity. The relation
of supremacy and subordination in competing jurisdictions demands a
simple and clear cut rule; flexibility is of evil, because it results in
confusion. Flexible terms, in other words, are even in the grant of
official power undesirable where the risk of error is a choice between
penalties.
CONCLUSION
It has been said that the strength of a statute lies in its general
phrases. The foregoing analysis shows that this is a half truth, for
there are statutes whose general phrases constitute their weakness.
Here as elsewhere closer examination reveals the need of discrimina-
tion. But the statement may be hazarded that where the legislative
policy is to confer specific benefits and not merely benefits of a verygeneral public character, and the corresponding detriment or prejudice
to interests is vague and speculative, general phrases are to be pre-ferred; where, on the other hand, the policy is primarily re strictive
or one of grudging concession, fixed and definite terms should be
chosen.
Presumptively, flexible terms are more appropriate to civil than to
criminal legislation. And this principle is applicable not only to the
contrast between fixed and flexible, but to all the varyirig grades of
generic and specific definition.
To illustrate: prima facie we should say that the recognition ofintangible property rights, a beneficial extension of the protection ofinterests, should be given by law in terms of general import. Legisla-
12 (1913) I CALIF. L. REv. 457.
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tive history confirms this. Under the power given to it by the federal
Constitution, Congress legislated as early as 1789 on the subjects of
patent and copyright. The protection of the patent law was given to
any new and useful art machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
This definition, using the most general terms, stands today as it was
originally framed, and while inevitable doubts have arisen as to the
meaning of the law, they could probably not have been avoided by more
elaborate definition. For the protection of copyright the system of
specification was adopted: with what result? The act of 1789 spoke
of maps, charts, and books; there were added in i8o2, designed,
engraved, and etched prints; in 1831, musical compositions; in 1856,
dramatic compositions; in 1865, photographs; in i87o, painting and
statuary. Finally in 1909 the method of specification was abandoned:
section 4 of the new Actes speaks simply of "writings" (it is plain
from the proviso in section 5 that this word is an error and that "works"
was intended), and the specifications given in section 5 are expressly
declared not to limit the subject-matter of copyright, which now finally
covers literary and artistic property in general. So the English Act
of I9II' speaks of every original literary, dramatic, musical, and
artistic work. Thus in the long run the superiority of the general
term has asserted itself for this species of enabling legislation.
" 35 St. at L. io76.
"Copyright Act, 191, sec. i (z).
